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Abstract
Risk communication literature suggests that for a number of reasons, the public may perceive a risk to be greater 
than indicated by its statistical probability. Public concern over risk can lead to significant and costly delays in 
project permitting and operations. Considering these theories, media coverage of CO2-related well blowouts in 2013 
gave rise to the questions: What is the risk of CO2 well blowouts associated with CCUS through CO2 EOR? What is 
the potential public perception of those risks? What information could be used to respond to public concern? To 
address these questions, this study aims to: 1) provide a framework for understanding the nature of onshore well 
blowouts, 2) quantify the incidence of such events for three specific geographic regions of Texas, 3) relate this data 
to CCUS and findings from other studies, and 4) explore the potential implications for public perception of this risk 
associated with CCUS projects. While quantifying answers to these questions proved to be challenging, the results 
from this study suggest that (1) the perceived risk of CO2 well blowouts may exceed the statistical risk and (2) 
information that could be used to address this gap could be made more readily available to the greater benefit of 
industry and stakeholders who support the development of CCUS as an option for addressing anthropogenic CO2
emissions. The study also suggests approaches to best conduct such data inquiries.
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1. Introduction
CO2 enhanced oil recovery (EOR) is becoming an important bridge to continue the commercial development of 
carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) [1]. Where CCUS projects continue to develop in scale through 
scoping, pilot, and demonstration phases, the CO2 EOR industry has a wealth of historical operations experience 
using CO2 to enhance the production of hydrocarbons in the United States since the 1970's [2]. The US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) projects CO2 EOR will have the largest increase in share of overall oil production 
from any EOR technology through 2040 in the US [3], with the potential to store billions of cubic feet of 
anthropogenic CO2 over this time frame. The increase in CO2 EOR prevalence will likely have indirect impacts on 
the public perception of CCUS because continued development will increase public exposure to the concepts and 
performance of projects that capture, inject, and store CO2 incidentally or intentionally. This paper explores the 
potential influence of CO2 well blowouts on public perception.
Risk communication literature and CCUS project experience show that public perception of risk can play an 
important role in project implementation [4, 5]. This literature further shows that the social amplification of risk can 
result in a situation where the public perceives risk to be greater than indicated by statistical evidence showing a risk 
to be unlikely, preventable, or manageable through project operation and comprehensive regulatory oversight [6].
For example, even though the very small statistical likelihood of complications during operations [7, 8] signifies that 
the oil and gas industry and their regulators routinely understand and mitigate the risks to well integrity during 
operations, the public remains largely unaware of such safety practices. The potential for the public to overestimate 
risk is stronger when the risk is unfamiliar and/or the impact is feared or dreaded [9]. When this is the case, public 
concern over risk can lead to significant and costly delays in project permitting and operations [5]. Therefore, a key 
challenge arises when public perception of risk differs from practical experience related to an event that is also 
unfamiliar or feared. Risk communication literature suggests that proactive engagement based on careful listening 
and honest, informative responses to concerns may address this challenge by helping stakeholders to put risk into 
perspective [4].
The term “well blowout” may invoke sensational images of large, acute incidents with the general public. While 
well blowouts are rare, they do occur and are mitigated. Moreover, as the use of CO2 EOR increases, so too will the 
absolute number of CO2 well blowout events likely increase and potentially attract media coverage. Given the 
lessons from risk communication theory, it is responsible to consider how the public will perceive the risk of CO2
well blowouts; how that perception will impact the deployment of CCUS projects, including those involving CO2
EOR; and whether there is sufficient information to proactively or adequately engage the public on this topic.
A recent chain of events illustrates need for this kind of assessment. In June 2013 there was broad media coverage 
of two different CO2 well blowouts, one current and the other during the previous two years. Although most news 
articles focused on one or the other incident, one article in July 2013 included both incidents in the same story, 
referenced a third blowout, and described the serious local impacts [10]. In August 2013, a stakeholder filed a 
comment in the docket of a proposed California CCUS project that cited that article and the broader media coverage 
in expressing concern regarding the risks from CO2 well blowouts [11]. Some of the non-cited media coverage 
pointed out that impacted residents were unhappy because they could not get information about the nature of the 
incident, the potential risks, and the steps being taken to mitigate. This example gave rise to the questions: What is 
the risk of CO2 well blowouts associated with CCUS through CO2 EOR? What is the potential public perception of 
those risks? What information could be used to respond to public concern?
Although research has assessed the mechanisms for well blowouts in CO2-specific applications, few studies have 
examined real-world frequencies and consequences of CO2-related blowouts [12]. More broadly, attempts have been 
made to quantify the risks of well blowouts within the offshore and Gulf Coast [13, 14], and to examine how other 
analogous oil and gas operations can relate to CO2-specific risks [7, 8]. There has been little in the way of studies 
that consider the potential impacts of these events on public perception or review the availability of information to 
respond to potential concerns. Therefore, this study seeks to: 1) provide a framework for understanding the nature of 
onshore well blowouts, 2) quantify the incidence of such events for three specific geographic regions of Texas, 3) 
relate this data and findings from other studies to CCUS, and 4) explore the potential implications for public 
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perception of this risk associated with CCUS projects. As hinted at by the title choice of this paper, the authors’ 
hypothesis is that CO2 well blowouts are more analogous to routine plumbing problems than to sensational, scary 
events. This hypothesis presumes that the incidence of well blowouts can be determined from public information, 
that it is small, and that there is publicly available information to help put these events into perspective. 
2. A Framework for Understand Well Blowouts
2.1. The Lifecycle of EOR Fields and Wells
CO2 EOR is one of the methods uses to enhance the production of hydrocarbons. Primary production is the first 
stage of the lifecycle of a field where hydrocarbons are produced under buoyancy or natural pressure differences 
between the surface and reservoir. When reservoir pressure and oil column height declines a source of pressure is 
needed to maintain economic production. Typically the second stage of recovery involves injecting water, brine, or 
gas into the production reservoir in order to move a portion of the remaining hydrocarbons towards production 
wells. The number of injection wells used for secondary recovery is based on field-specific data, and may be 
converted former production wells or new wells. Production during secondary recovery declines because of 
decreasing mobility of oil [15]. Tertiary recovery methods to modify the properties of reservoir fluids so that 
additional oil is mobilized include a number of techniques referred to as EOR, and include the use of CO2. At 
suitable pressure and temperatures, CO2 is partially or wholly miscible with oil, decreasing viscosity and increasing 
volume, favoring hydrocarbon mobilization and transport to production wells. Such EOR practices can extend the
life of a field by 20-25 years or more beyond the end of secondary recovery [16].
In addition to different stages of development of an oil field, wells within an oil field undergo different stages. 
The typical lifecycle of a well includes the stages of drilling (preparation of the borehole), completion (construction 
of the well by placing and cementing of long-string casing and installation of tubing, packers, and wellhead),
operation (injection or production), workover (repair or retrofit for reuse), and closure (plugging and abandonment).
Drilling a well is costly so operators will prolong well life through maintenance and repairs and repurpose wells 
when the field changes to a different mode (e.g., moving from primary to secondary recovery). Wells can be shut-in 
or temporarily abandoned so that they can be re-opened at a future date. Typically wells are only permanently 
plugged and abandoned when they cannot be economically repaired or if there is no more chance of producing oil or 
other minerals from the subsurface. Note that state regulatory agencies require regular testing and reporting of well 
construction, status and condition in order to mitigate past practices that could increase risks to people, property, or 
the environment. This has largely led to a small statistical likelihood of well complications occurring [17].
2.2. Terminology
Several types of events/conditions are grouped into a category defined as “loss of well control” with well 
blowout perhaps being the most common and sensational term in the lexicology. Loss of well control occurs any 
time when fluids migrate slowly or rapidly through or along the engineered well system in a manner other than the 
designed operation into an unintended geologic formation or to the surface. CO2 adds to well control risk because 
pressure is usually increased to improve oil-CO2 miscibility and CO2 is a buoyant and low viscosity fluid. Within 
the regulatory community, loss of well control has also been referred to as surface/subsurface releases, mechanical 
failure, down hole problem, and illegal releases. In the scientific literature, such events have been referred to as well 
failures, CO2 leakage [18], and migration and seepage [19]. Some of these names describe symptoms that can 
identify the occurrence of a blowout (e.g., leakage) rather than the actual event itself. Such events can occur through 
mechanical failures or failure to identify flawed construction (e.g., corroded or damaged equipment), if a flood 
encounters previously unaccounted for (i.e., orphan) wells, by operational errors (e.g. operating a well at higher than 
designed pressures), or even unpredictable circumstances (e.g., livestock) [12, 18, 20].
2.3. Loss of Control Mechanisms, Impacts, and Mitigation
Multiple barriers exist to prevent complications during the lifecycle of a well, including proper design, 
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construction, and routine maintenance informed by regulations and best practices. Properly constructed and operated 
wells are designed to isolate fluids in the subsurface so that 1) fluids in different zones do not comingle and 2) the 
well can be used effectivity to produce or inject fluids into the intended zones without interference with other zones.
This can be achieved through a number of well–developed technologies used to control fluid migration during 
drilling, construction, operation, repair, and plugging of a well. During well drilling, construction, and completion, 
well control is based on an engineered combination of fluid weights and viscosities and well construction materials 
such as multiple steel casings, packers, tubulars, and cements in order to isolate the reservoir from shallower 
transmissive zones. Inside the casing, tubing, packers, and wellhead valves are installed to control fluids within the 
well. When drilling a well where knowledge of downhole pressures and compositions of the fluids potentially 
encountered is incomplete and the casing has not been set and cemented in place, equipment such as blowout 
preventers can be installed to mitigate operational risks. Such equipment would be used when drilling a new well 
into a zone already under CO2 injection.
Formation pressures will increase during any type of injection in the intended injection formation, adding risk to 
existing wells, which is widely recognized and regulated during permitting of injection by Federal and/or state 
regulatory organizations to ensure such pressure increases do not lead to unintended fluid migration into different 
geologic formations. Corrosion management, with regular inspection and maintenance are standard best practices 
and required by regulatory authorities.
During workovers, if well control technologies such as parts of the wellhead or the downhole packer are 
removed, robust technologies are available, such as injection of dense “kill fluid” or lubricators to control fluid 
migration to maintain control, although errors are possible. When a well is removed from service, isolation 
equipment such as removable bridge plugs are installed, and scheduled mechanical integrity testing is required. 
Finally, when a well is prepared for abandonment, multiple barriers are emplaced to isolate the reservoir from 
shallower geologic formations and the surface, including a regulatory prescribed set of cement plugs, with the 
intervals between them usually filled with drilling mud.
Unintended migration along wellbores resulting in blowouts can be caused by poorly bonded cement between 
casing and borehole, mechanical integrity failure of plugged and abandoned wells , casing corrosion, and tubing and 
packer failures [7, 21, 22]. The quality of the cement job in a well can do much to allow (through corrosion or poor 
bonds) or inhibit (through self-healing cements) fluid flow to these fast-flow leakage pathways [22, 23, 24]. Slower 
leakage pathways are also a focus for research, such as diffusion through a caprock [18], or through abandoned 
wellbores [25]. The process for rectifying well blowouts is dynamic and site-specific, with a number of methods 
available. Prior to mechanical repair of the well it is necessary to kill (i.e., hydraulically control) the well by 
injecting high density fluids at a rapid enough rate downhole to increase hydraulic head and well-friction, stopping
of blowing fluid [21, 26].
3. Methods and Data Analysis
3.1. Study Area
This study examines the blowout frequency for three regions of Texas. Texas was chosen because it is the 
world's largest producer of oil through CO2 EOR, and is the most prolific conventional oil and gas producer in the 
United States. From 1998-2011, Texas production averaged 21% of all U.S. crude oil, and nearly 26% of all U.S.
gross natural gas (Figure 1, [27]). The study uses data from three geographic areas, Texas Railroad Commission 
(RRC) Districts 3, 8, and 8A (Figure 2). Data is primarily collected online from the RRC databases, which manages 
and oversees oil and gas operations in the state of Texas and administratively delineates these Districts.
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Fig. 1. (a) Texas Oil and Gas Production, 1998-2011 (b) Texas Oil and Gas Production vs. U.S. Total Production, 1998-2011.
Fig. 2. Texas Railroad Commission Oil and Gas Division Districts Map.
These data include oil and gas well drilling, completion, production and operation, injection, plugging, orphan 
(i.e., abandoned), and well blowouts for the period 1998-2011 (Tables 1 and 2). However, while the RRC keeps 
fairly comprehensive records, some data points were lacking, similar to observations made by Skalle and Podio [13]. 
For example, only three well blowout records in surveyed Districts mention the term “CO2” in their blowout 
records, preventing definitive categorization for CO2-related events. The study therefore was widened to include all 
blowouts of any type of well as an analogue to the performance of wells in these Districts. 
Districts 3, 8, and 8A are chosen because they represent operational and geographical dichotomies. Districts 8 
(a)
(b)
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and 8A are located primarily in the Permian Basin in West Texas while District 3 is located in southeast Texas along 
the Texas Gulf Coast. District 8 had the highest overall activity from 1998-2011 for wells authorized and/or 
permitted for drilling, completions, injection and plugging (Table 1). Districts 8 and 8A feature the highest amount 
of active CO2 injection wells in the state of Texas with 978 and 1,016 respectively. In contrast, District 3 has only 35 
currently active CO2 injection wells. While operators in Districts 8 and 8A produced significantly more oil, 
operators in District 3 have produced more natural gas from 1998-2011 than Districts 8 and 8A combined. 
Understanding these contrasts of geography and operations can help to isolate whether CO2 related injection is a 
factor for an increase (or decrease) in well blowout frequencies. 
Table 1. Texas RRC District Well and Production Numbers, 1998-2011.
3.2. Well Blowout Data
Using the RRC online blowout database [28] and the RRC’s paper records, found at 1701 Congress Ave., 
Austin, TX, 78701, well blowout data was extracted for Districts 3, 8, and 8A. Data found online includes: date of 
incident, operator, lease/facility name/ID, permit #, well #, field name, county, if fire or H2S were present, and the 
number of deaths and/or injuries. General remarks associated with each event were used to attempt to quantify 
leaking fluid type, volume of fluid leaked (estimated), and depth of the well failure. Additionally, general remarks 
were used to organize blowouts based on the stage of development as indicated in section 2.1. These stages include: 
Drilling, Completion, Production/Operation, Workover, Injection, Abandoned, Other, and Uncategorized. Two 
categories in particular bear further mention. “Other” includes incidents such as trucks running over wells and 
contractor equipment error. Uncategorized incidents did not contain enough information either online or in physical 
records to discern the stage of development at which the blowout occurred. Instead, to quantify the risk of a blowout 
occurring during a given stage in the surveyed Districts, comparisons were made between the number of blowouts 
from a given stage to the overall number of wells populated for that stage; this approach loosely followed the 
methods in Jordan and Benson [8] (Table 2). Finally, weighted averages to calculate District frequencies for all 
stages, and blowout rates per 100 wells were calculated. 
3.3. Reporting Survey Difficulties
An initial goal for this study was to survey multiple states’ databases for blowout data. Initial scoping was met 
with limited success, and results for seven states surveyed are shown in Appendix A. There are no standard formats 
for reporting loss of control events at the Federal or state level; consequently, many states have varying levels of 
accessibility for reporting ranging from relatively organized to completely unavailable. With such a wide degree of 
reporting standards, it was difficult to gather the desired data. Some states had solid datasets for well control 
incidents, while others had large sets of unorganized data. Others had no data available online for such blowouts,
and one state does not keep paper records of any well blowout. Instead, blowouts are dealt with on a verbal basis 
between the regulatory authority and the operator of the field where the blowout occurs. This presented multiple 
problems for the quantitative aspects of this study and it became apparent that the fully quantitative dataset being 
Wells 
Drilled
Well 
Completions 
(Total)
Workovers Production Wells Injection/Disposal 
Permits (Total)
Secondary 
Injection Wells 
(Active, CO2)
District 3 7,063 9,535 2,895 10,968 922 35
District 8 20,468 26,344 4,543 48,897 5,098 978
District 8A 8,523 9,831 1,622 22,622 3,804 1,016
Plugged 
Wells
Orphan Wells Oil (BBL) Casinghead (MCF) Gas Well Gas (MCF) Condensate (BBL)
District 3 8,759 584 4.11E+08 1.070E+09 8.507E+09 2.003E+08
District 8 12,541 394 1.71E+09 3.929E+09 5.436E+09 1.753E+07
District 8A 6,613 38 1.74E+09 2.540E+09 2.684E+08 1.210E+06
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sought was not available, even after selective supplementary records searching. As such, this shifted the focus of this 
study to more selective blowout data gathering, supplemented by discussions of social perceptions of CO2 well 
blowouts and recommendations for data inclusion for states.
4. Data Analysis Results
4.1. Overall Blowout Populations
As of March 2014, there were 616 recorded blowouts for Districts 3, 8, and 8A from 1942 to 2013 in the RRC 
records database. Of these, 158 occurred from 1998-2011 with District 3 having the highest number of recorded 
blowouts at 75, followed by District 8 with 49 and District 8A with 35 (Table 2). Table 2 distinguishes each 
District’s respective categorical breakdown from largest number of occurrences for a given stage to smallest. All 
Districts shared the same top four development stages for well blowout occurrence: Drilling, Completion, 
Workovers, and Production/Operation. The largest single blowout population category for Districts 3, 8, and 8A was 
29 (Drilling), 28 (Drilling), 11 (Production/Operation) respectively. 
Table 2. Texas RRC District Blowouts, 1998-2011.
Development Stage District 3 District 8 District 8A
Drilling 29 28 7
Completion 9 5 6
Workover 7 7 9
Production and 
Operation
19 3 11
Injection 0 1 0
Shut in 0 0 1
Plugging 6 1 0
Abandoned 1 0 0
Other 3 2 1
Uncategorized 1 2 0
District Total 75 49 35
4.2. Calculated Blowout Frequencies
Table 3 shows the frequency of blowouts during each operational stage for RRC Districts 3, 8, and 8A from 
1998-2011. No quantification was possible for shut-in wells as RRC shut-in records could not be organized by date 
of shut-in. Based on Table 3, the highest frequencies of blowouts for any given District barely exceeded one half 
percent of the overall population totals for wells at a given stage. Only one-third of all populated fields have 
frequencies that exceed 0.1%; all remaining categories fall on the hundredth or thousandth (or no frequency at all) 
percentage scale. For District 3, drilling was calculated to be the riskiest stage for blowouts based on frequency, 
while in Districts 8 and 8A workover was calculated to be the riskiest stage. District 3 also had the highest blowout 
frequency per stage of development for completions, production/operation, plugging, and abandoned wells. District 
8 had the highest blowout frequency during injection, while District 8A had the highest for workovers.
.
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Table 3. Texas RRC District Blowout Frequencies (1998-2011) with frequency comparisons to Jordan and Benson [8] and Skalle and Podio [13].
Percent Frequency Per 100 Wells
District 3 District 8 District 8A CA District 
4 [8]
District 3 District 8 District 
8A
TX Gulf 
Coast [13]
Drilling 0.411% 0.137% 0.082% 0.048% 0.411 0.137 0.082
Completion 0.084% 0.019% 0.061% 0.084 0.019 0.061
Workover 0.242% 0.154% 0.555% 0.058% 0.242 0.154 0.555
Production/
Operation 0.173% 0.006% 0.049% 0.006% 0.173 0.006 0.049
Injection 0.000% 0.020% 0.000% 0.011% 0.000 0.020 0.000
Shut in 0.001% 0.000 0.000 0.000
Plugging 0.080% 0.008% 0.000% 0.029% 0.080 0.008 0.000
Abandoned 0.171% 0.000% 0.000% 0.029% 0.171 0.000 0.000
Cumulative 
Average 0.174% 0.038% 0.062% 0.174 0.038 0.062 0.15
4.3. Worker Injury and Death
One measure of incident severity is the occurrence of worker injuries or deaths associated with a blowout. 
Overall, these incident types make up small percentages of the overall frequency totals (Table 4). Only District 3 
documented an incident of a death associated with a well blowout which occurred during a drilling stage blowout,
equating to a 0.014% frequency. All three Districts had blowouts documenting worker injury with the highest 
documentations occurring in District 8 with 6. Another means for qualitatively understanding the severity of a well 
blowout incident is the recording of complications with fire and H2S onsite during the incident. Districts 8 and 8A 
featured higher documented cases of H2S with 9 and 15 cases respectively, while District 3 had more documented 
fire occurrences with 7 cases (Table 4). However, the highest overall occurrence frequencies for H2S, fire, and 
worker injuries all occurred in District 8A at a 0.062%. Such occurrences were not mutually exclusive: there was 
one instance of both H2S and injuries reported for a well blowout in 8A.
Table 4. Texas RRC District Blowout Fires, Injuries, Deaths, and H2S, 1998-2011. Frequency percentages are listed for under each respective 
populated cell. Operational stage categories with no incidents are not included.
District 3 District 8 District 8A
Fire Injury Death H2S Fire Injury Death H2S Fire Injury Death H2S
Drilling 30.042
2
0.028
1
0.014
5
0.024
8
0.039
7
0.034
3
0.035
Completion 20.023 3 0.01
2
0.02
1
0.01
Workover 10.035
1
0.035
1
0.022
1
0.022
2
0.044
1
0.062
1
0.062
1
0.06
Production and 
Operation
1
0.009
1
0.009 2
4
0.018
Plugging 10.011
1
0.011
2
0.016
Other 2 2
District Total 7 5 1 5 6 11 0 15 1 3 0 9
5. Discussion
5.1. Relating Well Blowouts to CCUS
What do these results suggest for the empirical risks of CO2-related blowouts? Overall, well blowout frequency 
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in each surveyed RRC District is small, on the order of tenths of a percent or smaller for a given development stage. 
District 3 had the highest absolute number of blowouts recorded, even with fewer wells drilled, completed, used for 
injection, and more plugged and abandoned wells than Districts 8 and 8A. As such, District 3, which features little 
CO2 EOR production, had higher blowout frequencies in drilling, completion, production, plugging, and abandoned 
wells. Districts 8 and 8A had higher blowout frequencies than District 3 for the workover and injection stages. 
While CO2 injection is a key part of the CO2 EOR process, comparing these frequencies suggests that a correlation 
between CO2-use and well blowout frequency in these RRC Districts is tenuous. For a majority of development 
stages, the District with the fewest CO2 EOR operations, District 3, had the highest blowout frequencies. While the 
dataset was too small to determine if this low frequency can be applied to a broader industry-wide scale, there is no 
reason to think otherwise.
5.2. Comparisons to Other Studies
The authors were able to find only two comparison studies that featured analogue activities (California steam 
EOR; [8]) or analogue geographic regions (Texas Gulf Coast; [13]). For comparisons, results from Jordan and 
Benson [8] were surveyed for drilling, workovers, production, injection, shut-in, plugging, and abandoned wells. 
Over a slightly longer timeframe (1991-2005), California's District 4, had higher absolute totals for well 
development stages when compared to RRC District totals for every category except for production, where RRC 
District 8 had higher totals from 1998-2011. For most instances of comparison (Table 3), RRC Districts had higher 
blowout frequency percentages for a given stage. This is particularly true for workovers, where all RRC Districts 
were an order of magnitude higher in blowout occurrence frequency than CA District 4. In fact, for drilling, 
production/operation, and workover, RRC District blowouts were as frequent as or more frequent than those in CA 
District 4.
For more geographically similar settings, Skalle and Podio [13] investigations showed that after surveying 
310,000 Texas Gulf Coast wells from RRC databases, the overall frequency percentage was 0.15% for well 
blowouts from 1960-1996. In comparison, District 3 has a higher weighted average and frequency of well blowouts 
per 100 wells when compared to Skalle and Podio [13]. Districts 8 and 8A have an order of magnitude smaller 
blowout frequency per 100 wells and weighted average.
5.3. Reporting Assessment Challenges
There were two main challenges to completing the analysis planned for this paper: 1) most states do not have 
accessible databases reporting loss of control events and those that do contain inconsistent amounts of data; and 2) 
even in the relatively comprehensive Texas database, significant amounts of data were not included in each report. 
The standard RRC reporting forms ask the operator to report the depth of the event as well as the type of fluid(s) and 
volume(s) leaked during the event. A review of the online reports and a subsequent review of select physical copies 
of reports submitted to RRC show that few reports include this information, possibly because many of these reports 
were completed during the occurrence of an incident. Consequently, information about depth, fluid type and volume 
was most likely either not known, or estimations for volumes and depths were difficult to discern during the event. 
When depths were provided, estimations usually amounted to a geologic formation name. After an incident, 
operators are required to submit a letter to RRC detailing what happened, per RRC Regulations [29]. However, not 
all incidents included a follow-up letter and the ones submitted for the most part did not report this information. 
5.4. Public Perception Impacts
As indicated in Section 1, this paper considered four simplified lessons from the risk communication literature: 
(1) the public tends to more negatively perceive the risk of events that are unfamiliar to them or could result in a 
dreaded outcome; (2) a negative perception can be relatively easily amplified to the point where the perceived risk is 
significantly greater than statistics indicate; (3) negative public perceptions can cause costly delays in project 
development; and (4) proactive engagement with honest discussion of risk could help to put public perception of 
risk into perspective. 
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Based on the analysis in this paper showing small blowout incidence in areas with available data, it seems that 
while there is the potential to avoid having the public develop an unfairly negative perception of the risk of onshore 
CO2 well blowouts, there are no systematic efforts in place to make this happen. At issue may be something of a 
“Catch 22” situation. Industry goes to great lengths to avoid well blowouts but appears reluctant to share 
information about prevention measures and the details of incidents in the rare instances when they occur. This leaves 
room, as in the case of the California comment referenced in Section 1, for unanswered questions to stimulate 
negative perceptions, possibly leading to project delays, increased costs, and additional measures to prevent 
blowouts.
While quantifying answers to these questions posed in Section 1 proved to be challenging, the results from this 
study suggest that (1) the perceived risk of CO2 well blowouts may in fact exceed the statistical risk and (2) 
information that could be used to address this gap could be made more readily available to the greater benefit of 
industry and stakeholders who support the development of CCUS as an option for addressing anthropogenic CO2
emissions.
6. Recommendations and Conclusions
The title of this paper was intended to stimulate discussion. As described in the introduction, it was selected 
because it reflects a starting hypothesis that CO2 well blowouts are more analogous to routine plumbing problems 
than to sensational, scary events. This hypothesis is predicated on being able to determine blowout incidence from 
publicly available information, finding that the frequency is very small, and having access to enough information to 
help the public put results into perspective. These conditions were only partially met for an analysis in three 
Districts in Texas; it was not feasible to conduct the analysis on a larger scale. 
Given the results of the limited analysis undertaken in this study, it would seem that there would be an overall 
benefit to implementing improved data reporting standards for well blowouts. The development of this data set 
could reveal if the existing approaches to prevention and mitigation are largely working, which would build public 
confidence. Access to this information could be used proactively to engage stakeholders in an effort to help them 
gain a better perspective on the relative risks and it could be used in permitting procedures where this issue is raised. 
It would be useful to have access to the following data: date, time and duration of incident; location 
(latitude/longitude, town/range, lease area); description of any leak(s) by fluid type(s), estimated fluid volume(s); 
and a description of known human, property, or environmental impacts. More importantly, in the case that such 
datasets are already reported, including such data in a simple online database can greatly increase ease of 
information accessibility. Alternatively, many states already scan forms for existing permits, authorizations to inject, 
plug, abandon, as well as other procedural paperwork for public access online. Adding well blowouts to the 
scanning list, based the frequencies discussed above, could be a manageable process with nominal costs to 
regulatory organizations, and quite possibly benefit the state, industry, and public stakeholders in the long term. 
In the case that CCUS operations, however unlikely, have similar complications, robust standards exist for 
reporting such complications. Ensuring that such information becomes available in an easily accessible database 
would streamline public and stakeholder access to such information. This in turn would make such incidents more 
known, which after examining blowout frequencies for RRC Districts that do and do not feature CO2 EOR 
operations, is a very small frequency of occurrence. It would be useful for those involved in CCUS outreach and 
engagement to prepare materials that synthesize this information for public consumption.
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Appendix A. Selected State Well Blowout Reporting Survey Results
Agency Online? Admin.Location Date Operator
Lease/Facility 
Name Lease/ID Permit #
Texas Railroad Commission Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Louisiana Dept. of Natural Resources Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mississippi Oil and Gas Board No No No No No No No
New Mexico
Oil 
Conservation 
Division
Yes No Yes Yes* Yes No No
Wyoming Oil and Gas Board No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Oklahoma Corporation Commission No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colorado Conservation Commission Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Well # Field Name County Fire H2S Injuries Deaths Depth
Texas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Louisiana Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Mississippi No No No No No No No No
New Mexico Yes No No No No No No Yes*
Wyoming N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Oklahoma Yes Yes* Yes N No No No No*
Colorado Yes No Yes No No No No No
Fluid Type Fluid Vol. Leaked
Event 
Duration
Workover 
Contractor
Texas No* No No Yes *Remarks column is the only place that mentions fluid types
Louisiana Yes* No No No *Incident codes are assigned, such as GW for groundwater, or G for gas, but not for all reported incidents
Mississippi No No No No
New Mexico Yes Yes No No *Depth to Groundwater, if GW was affected
Wyoming N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Fluid Type Fluid Vol. Leaked
Event 
Duration
Workover 
Contractor
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes No
* Depth could be mentioned in the operator report under 
165: 10-7-5 (c)(B)(v): Circumstances surrounding 
discharge of deleterious substance(s) and whether 
discharge was to water or soil 
Colorado Yes* Yes Yes** No
*Incident Reports that have been finalized include columns 
for oil, water, and other types of fluids spilled
** Duration of Events can be gleaned from the Final 
Resolution dates of the event in question
